The party heads the Civic Coalition, which was founded in 2018. Since its creation, it has shown strong electoral performances in Warsaw, the west, and the north of Poland. Since the 2000s, the Civic Platform has established itself as one of the dominant political parties in Poland.
History
The Civic Platform was founded in 2001 as economically liberal, Christian-democratic split from existing parties. Founders Andrzej Olechowski, Maciej Płażyński, and Donald Tusk were sometimes jokingly called "the Three Tenors" by Polish media and commentators. Olechowski and Płażyński left the party during the 2001–2005 parliamentary term, leaving Tusk as the sole remaining founder, and current party leader.
In the 2001 general election, the party secured 12.6% of the vote and 65 deputies in the Sejm, making it the largest opposition party to the government led by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). In the 2002 local elections, PO stood together with Law and Justice in 15 voivodeships (in 14 as POPiS, in Podkarpacie with another centre-right political parties). They stood separately only in Mazovia.
The POPiS coalition won 12% of the popular vote nationally, which was well below the expectations. Ludwik Dorn, the chairman of the PiS parliamentary club at the time, remarked: "Together, we gained as much as the PO itself collected a year earlier." This marked the point at which PO and PiS, until now ideological and political allies, started to grow apart. The leadership of PiS decided that it had to distance itself from PO and change its ideology in order to increase its popular support.[4]
In 2005, PO led all opinion polls with 26% to 30% of public support. However, in the 2005 general election, in which it was led by Jan Rokita, PO polled only 24.1% and unexpectedly came second to the 27% garnered by Law and Justice (PiS). A centre-right coalition of PO and PiS (nicknamed POPiS) was deemed most likely to form a government after the election. Yet the putative coalition parties had a falling out in the wake of the fiercely contested Polish presidential election of 2005.
In the 2005 elections, PiS attacked PO by campaigning on a difference between "liberal Poland" and its "social Poland". The former was marked by economic liberalism, austerity, deregulation and "serving the rich". In contrast, Law and Justice stressed its "social" character, pledging policies that would help the poor. The party attacked Civic Platform's flat tax proposal and advocated a much more active role of the state in the economy. Law and Justice also made "an offer to the left", stressing its economically left-wing policies.[5]
Ultimately, Lech Kaczyński (PiS) won the second round of the presidential election on 23 October 2005 with 54% of the vote, ahead of Tusk, the PO candidate. Due to the demands of PiS for control of all the armed ministries (the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the office of the Prime Minister, PO and PiS were unable to form a coalition. Instead, PiS formed a coalition government with the support of the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP). PO became the opposition to this PiS-led coalition government.
The PiS-led coalition fell apart in 2007 amid a corruption scandal involving Andrzej Lepper and Tomasz Lipiec[6] and internal leadership disputes. These events led to new elections, and in the 21 October 2007 parliamentary election PO won 41.51% of the popular vote and 209 out of 460 seats in the Sejm and 60 out of 100 seats in the Senate of Poland. Civic Platform, now the largest party in both houses of parliament, subsequently formed a coalition with the Polish People's Party (PSL).
In November 2010, local elections granted Civic Platform about 30.1 percent of the votes and PiS at 23.2 percent, an increase for the former and a drop for the latter compared to the 2006 elections.[7] PO succeeded in winning four consecutive elections (a record in post-Communist Poland), and Tusk remains as kingmaker. PO's dominance is also a reflection of left-wing weakness and divisions on both sides of the political scene, with PiS suffering a splinter in Autumn 2010.[7] Civic Platform won the plurality of votes in the 9 October 2011 parliamentary election, gaining 39.18% of the popular vote, 207 of 460 seats in the Sejm, and 63 out of 100 seats in the Senate.[8]
In the 2015 parliamentary election, PO came in second place, after PiS, achieving 24.09% of the popular vote, 138 out of 460 seats in the Sejm, and 34 out of 100 seats in the Senate.[12] In the 2018 local elections, PO achieved 26.97% of the votes, coming second after PiS.[13] In the 2019 European elections, PO participated in the European Coalition electoral alliance which achieved 38.47%, coming second after PiS.[14]
On 1 October 2023, it held The Million Hearts march in Warsaw.[15]
Ideology
Civic Platform banner carried during the opposition march on 4 June 2023
Since 2007, when Civic Platform formed the government, the party has gradually moved from its Christian-democratic stances, and many of its politicians hold more liberal positions on social issues. In 2013, the Civic Platform's government introduced public funding of in vitro fertilization program. Civic Platform also supports civil unions for same-sex couples but is against same-sex marriage and the adoption of children by same-sex couples. The party also currently supports liberalization of the abortion law,[45] which it had opposed while in government.[46]
After becoming the biggest opposition party, the Civic Platform became more culturally liberal and populist.[58][59][60][61] This tendency is especially popular among the younger generation of the party's politicians, such as mayor of Warsaw and presidential candidate Rafał Trzaskowski. The party has also changed its opinion about the social programs of PiS, starting to support them.[62][63][64] Since being in government again, the party has taken an anti-immigration stance to migrants coming from Russia and Belarus.[65]
Civic Platform's support is concentrated in the west and north of the country. Areas voting for Bronisław Komorowski in 2010 are shaded orange above.
As of 2020, the party enjoyed the greatest support in large cities and among people with higher education and in managerial positions, while in terms of age, the electorate was evenly distributed,[66] and the electoral base of the Civic Platform lay in middle-aged, highly educated gold-collar and white-collar workers of the middle and upper-middle classes.[66] As of 2020, the Civic Platform electorate was made up of more women than men, was disproportionally represented by middle-aged, urban and middle-class voters, and was characterized by higher levels of education, higher position in the socio-professional structure, as well as moderate religiosity and Roman Catholicism.[67] The party consistently enjoyed overwhelming support of workers such as directors, managers and specialists, business owners and co-owners, and administrative workers.[66] At the same time, the party underperformed amongst blue-collar workers, young voters, farmers and students, as well as unemployed voters.[66] In regards to age, Civic Platform performed the best amongst voters aged 40–49, while also performing strongly among 30-39 and 50-59 year olds. The party performs the worst amongst the oldest (aged 60 or more) and the youngest (aged 29 or less) voters.[66] The party strongly appealed to urban voters, as almost a half of voters living in big cities (500,000 people or more) vote for Civic Platform; support for the party remains strong in middle-sized cities but strongly declines in small towns and the countryside, as on average only 15% of rural voters support it.[66]
As of 2016, an overwhelming majority of party's supporters (83%) were Roman Catholics, and 44% of these voters partook in religious practices at least once a week.[68] As of 2016, the party was supported by the Christian left, as well as liberal and moderate Catholics,[68] while most of conservative Catholics in Poland support Law and Justice instead.[68] Churchgoing Catholics are roughly evenly split between Civic Platform and Law and Justice, with a significant minority of churchgoers supporting Polish People's Party as well.[68] Catholics who support Civic Platform "oppose, on the one hand, the state's enforcement of religious norms and, on the other, do not condone their violation".[69] This is largely consistent with the party's attitude towards religion, which combines a moderately conservative and politically Catholic program with left-wing economic slogans, supported by Catholic social teaching and the teaching of John Paul II contained in the encyclical Centesimus annus.[69]
As of 2020, most of Civic Platform's electorate identified as liberal conservatives, centrists and moderate conservatives.[70] No tendency dominates, as the party's supporters are roughly evenly split between political tendencies - 35% of party's supporters identify with political center, 28% as left-wing, and 24% as right-wing.[70] Throughout the 2010s, Civic Platform had been losing left-wing supporters due to the re-emergence of Lewica as well as Janusz Palikot's defection from the party.[70] The party also faced a challenge from Nowoczesna, whose vote "came largely from former Civic Platform supporters, disappointed with its failure to shake off its social conservatism".[71] According to Janusz Jartyś of the University of Szczecin, the ideological base of Civic Platform are "national-conservative, liberal and social-democratic voters", with each faction expecting "at least partial implementation of their demands, stability in the governance of the country and social peace".[72] According to Søren Riishøj, the party is also unpopular amongst the traditionally social-democratic voters, who are opposed to Europeanisation and globalization, and are critical of the Civic Platform's "almost U.S. type of election campaign."[73]
As of 2021, according to CBOS, Civic Platform was overwhelmingly popular amongst pro-European voters, with almost 80% of party's supporters wishing to cooperate with the European Union more.[74] The party is generally supported by moderates, as most of the party's voters wish for a "compromise" on issues such as abortion.[74] Economically, the party is supported by pro-business and welfare-oriented voters alike; while most of Civic Platform's supporters believe that Poland should become a welfare state, they are evenly split on issues such as progressive taxation and flat tax, and nationalization vs. privatization.[74] The party has also enjoyed the support of regionalists, autonomists and voters supportive of decentralization and localism in general.[74] Over 90% of Civic Platform supporters believe that local governments should have more power and that the national government should devolve its power to the regional governments of gminas and voivodeships.[74] The party is supported by Silesian regionalists,[75] and had organized joint electoral lists with Silesian parties like Silesian Autonomy Movement and Silesian Regional Party.[76] Local politicians of the Civic Platform in Silesia are often associated with Silesian regionalism as well.[77] The party also enjoys support from the Kashubians and their local autonomist movement,[78] with the co-founder of the party, Donald Tusk, having expressed his support for autonomous Kashubia in 1992.[79]
In March 2023, Tusk stated that Silesian should be considered a language rather than an ethnolect as it has unique literature and grammar, and promised to recognize Silesian as an official, statutory language of Upper Silesia.[80][81] Tusk also declared that he was a regionalist.[80]
^Budny, Michał (2022). "The Process of Acquiring Political Relevance of Law and Justice Elections". Political Preferences. 30 (2). Institute of Local Initiatives: 50. doi:10.31261/polpre.2022.2.45-59.
^Millard, Frances (2007). "The 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland". Electoral Studies. 26. Colchester: University of Essex: 213.
^ abPaweł Kamiński; Patrycja Rozbicka (2016). "Political Parties and Trade Unions in the Post-Communist Poland: Class Politics that Have Never a Chance to Happen". Polish Political Science Yearbook. 45 (1): 198. doi:10.15804/ppsy2016015. ISSN0208-7375. Interestingly, though, more of them have supported the neoliberal centre-right Civil Platform, which in power with its coalition partner PSL (Polish Peasants' Party) since 2008 until 2015.
^Sean Hanley; Aleks Szczerbiak; Tim Haughton; Brigid Fowler (2008). "Sticking Together: Explaining Comparative Centre—Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe". Party Politics. 14 (4): 436. doi:10.1177/1354068808090253. ISSN1426-8876. S2CID16727049. This argument also seems broadly confirmed taking into account more recent developments in Poland where both large newer centre-right parties, Civic Platform and Law and Justice, have developed more complex ideological narratives centring on the nature of post-communist transformation.
^Anna Pacześniak; Michał Jacuński; Jean-Michel De Waele (2012). "Ideological Identification of Medium–Level Party Cadres in Poland". Polish Political Science Yearbook. 41 (1): 383. doi:10.15804/ppsy2012019. ISSN0208-7375. Since 2005 the main political competitors have been two parties with Solidarity roots enjoying the highest electoral support: the right–wing Law and Justice (PiS) and the centre–right Civic Platform (PO).
Nathaniel Copsey (2013). "Poland:An Awkward Partner Redeemed". In Simon Bulmer; Christian Lequesne (eds.). The Member States of the European Union (Second ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 191. ISBN9780199544837.
"The perfect enemy: From migrants to sexual minorities". CHR Michelsen Institute. 2019. Retrieved 28 February 2023. The tactic worked well for the PiS is in 2015 when anti-migrant rhetoric drummed up the party´s support before its election defeat of the governing centre-left Civic Platform.
"Poland's ruling party picks LGBTQ rights as election battlefront". NBC News. 15 March 2019. Retrieved 28 February 2023. The tactic worked for PiS previously, analysts said, noting how in 2015 it used anti-migrant rhetoric to drum up support before its election defeat of the governing center-left Civic Platform.
^Sean Hanley; Aleks Szczerbiak; Tim Haughton; Brigid Fowler (2008). "Sticking Together: Explaining Comparative Centre—Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe". Party Politics. 14 (4): 417. doi:10.1177/1354068808090253. ISSN1426-8876. S2CID16727049. Instead, three new centre-right and right-wing parliamentary parties emerged: the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO), the national-social conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, and the clerical-nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR).
Seleny, Anna (July 2007). "Communism's Many Legacies in East-Central Europe". Journal of Democracy. 18 (3): 156–170. doi:10.1353/jod.2007.0056. S2CID154971163.
^Kowalczyk, Krzysztof (2015). "Stanowiska polskich partii politycznych wobec religii i Kościoła. Propozycja typologii". Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis (in Polish). 15 (1). University of Silesia in Katowice: 250. ISSN2353-9747. When it was established in 2001, the Civic Platform (PO) referred to liberal and conservative values. In its ideological declaration, Christian values were recognised as one of the canons.
^Marjorie Castle (2015). "Poland". In M. Donald Hancock; Christopher J. Carman; Marjorie Castle; David P. Conradt; Raffaella Y. Nanetti; Robert Leonardi; William Safran; Stephen White (eds.). Politics in Europe. CQ Press. p. 636. ISBN978-1-4833-2305-3.
^Søren Riishøj[in Danish] (2010). "The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011". Political Science Publications. 24 (1): 30. In other words, on the policy and programme level the Civic Platform (PO) developed into a centre-right soft Thatcherite liberal, anti-communist, soft Christian nationalist and populist party.
^Szymon Wróbel (2011). "Mourning Populism. The Case of Poland". Polish Sociological Review. 176 (1): 445, 448. JSTOR41478893. On the other hand however, the victory of Civic Platform (CP) [Platforma Obywatelska] in the parliamentary elections in September 2007 had much to do with the promise of a new Ireland, our dream to come true. The fact that it was such a successful message and that it became a true banner of the victory allows us to see CP's success in terms of populism. (...) If we come back to Laclau's distinction one could even say that CP's populism and L&J's populism seek to attain what Laclau recognizes as unconceivable.
Davison, Dan; Pospieszyńska, Ewa (2 October 2023). "On Migration, the Polish Left Has All But Given Up". Novara Media. With the Civic Coalition trying to woo Law and Justice voters by repackaging its xenophobia, it falls to the Polish left to change the narrative on immigration.
|""A powerful shot from a cannon." Tusk announces suspension of right to asylum". oko.press. 12 October 2024. "There is no surprise, but Prime Minister Tusk went further than expected: he announced the suspension of the right to asylum. He said: "One of the elements of the migration strategy will be a temporary, territorial suspension of the right to asylum, and I will demand recognition in Europe for this decision.
^ abKowalczyk, Krzysztof (2015). "Stanowiska polskich partii politycznych wobec religii i Kościoła. Propozycja typologii". Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis (in Polish). 15 (1). University of Silesia in Katowice: 168. ISSN2353-9747.
^Søren Riishøj[in Danish] (2010). "The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011". Political Science Publications. 24 (1): 15.
^ abcdeRoguska, Beata (August 2021). "Elektoraty o istotnych kwestiach społeczno-politycznych". Komunikat z Badań (in Polish). 91 (1). Centre for Public Opinion Research: 9–10. ISSN2353-5822.
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