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Michigan v. Bryant

Michigan v. Bryant
Argued October 5, 2010
Decided February 28, 2011
Full case nameMichigan, Petitioner v. Richard Perry Bryant
Docket no.09-150
Citations562 U.S. 344 (more)
131 S. Ct. 1143; 179 L. Ed. 2d 93
ArgumentOral argument
Case history
PriorDefendant convicted at trial; affirmed, case n°247039, 2004 WL 1882661 (Mich. Ct. App., 2004); vacated and remanded in light of Davis v. Washington, 477 Mich. 902, 722 N.W.2d 797 (2006); affirmed anew, case n°247039, 2007 WL 675471 (Mich. Ct. App., 2006); reversed, 483 Mich. 132, 768 N.W.2d 65 (2009)
SubsequentRemanded to Michigan Supreme Court.
Holding
Dying murder victim identification and description of the shooter and of the location of the shooting were not testimonial statements, because they had a “primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”. Their admission at trial did not violate the defendant rights under the Confrontation clause.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
Clarence Thomas · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer · Samuel Alito
Sonia Sotomayor · Elena Kagan
Case opinions
MajoritySotomayor, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Alito
ConcurrenceThomas (in judgment)
DissentScalia
DissentGinsburg
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. VI

Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court further developed the "primary purpose" test to determine whether statements are "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes.[1] In Bryant, the Court expanded upon the test first articulated in Davis v. Washington, "addressing for the first time circumstances in which the 'ongoing emergency' discussed in Davis extended to a potential threat to the respond police and the public at large."[1]

The Court stated that determination of whether an interrogation's primary purpose was to assist in an "ongoing emergency" was an objective evaluation of the circumstances "in which the encounter occur[ed] and the statements and actions of the parties."[1]

Background

Detroit Police Department officers were dispatched to a gas station parking lot and found Anthony Covington severely wounded lying next to his car.[2] Covington told the police officers that he had been shot by Richard Bryant through the back door of Bryant's house as he turned to leave. The conversation with officers lasted five to ten minutes before ambulance services arrived.[2] Covington died hours later and Bryant was charged with murder.[2]

At trial, the officers testified about what Covington said. Bryant was found guilty of murder. The testimony of the officers was challenged as testimonial hearsay. Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed Bryant's conviction, holding that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as explained in Crawford v. Washington (2004), rendered Covington's statements inadmissible testimonial hearsay.[3]

Opinion of the Court

The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Michigan Supreme Court's ruling, and held that the victim's statements were not testimonial hearsay, meaning the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of the evidence. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to Michigan courts to decide whether the statements were otherwise permissible under state hearsay rules. The test the court relied on was the primary purpose test. That test draws a distinction between statements made to the authorities that are aimed at gathering facts for the purpose of prosecution versus statements made because there is an ongoing emergency.[4]

Scalia's Dissent

In Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent, he criticized the majority opinion for distorting the "Confrontation Clause jurisprudence" and leaving the clause in "shambles."[5] Scalia stated that for a statement to be "testimonial", the declarant must have intended that the statement be "a solemn declaration rather than an unconsidered or offhand remark," and therefore the investigator's intent was irrelevant.

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c Paul F. Rothstein & Ronald J. Coleman, Confrontation's Multi-Analyst Problem, 9 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 165, 171 (2021).
  2. ^ a b c Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 349 (2011)
  3. ^ Bryant, 562 U.S. at 350.
  4. ^ Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150, slip op. at 1 (2011).
  5. ^ "Michigan v. Bryant". Oyez. Retrieved April 9, 2023.
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