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Western Syria clashes (December 2024–present)
Following the fall of the Assad regime after several offensives launched by opposition groups between late November and early December 2024, several clashes between Assad loyalists and incumbent Syrian transitional government forces have occurred primarily in hold-outs in the Alawite-majority Tartus and Latakia Governorates, as well as in western Hama and Homs Governorates. There have also been hundreds of reports across Syria of civilians belonging to the Alawite sect and other religious minorities being murdered and persecuted following the collapse of the regime.[10][11] Government action was taken to comb through villages in Western Syria in order to find and arrest or take down officers and officials associated with war crimes of the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war. The clashes were triggered by the proliferation of videos on social media showing footage of an attack on the Abu Abdullah al-Hussein al-Khusseibi shrine in Aleppo, which occurred in November. This led to the incitement of several demonstrations and civil unrest among Alawite communities by Assad loyalist elements in Western Syria. Following the fall of the Assad regime, UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights NGO reported several attacks against civilians in the region, carried out by unidentified gunmen, resulting in the deaths of more than 293 civilians, 125 of whom were confirmed to have been killed in sectarian violence.[11][12][13] On 29 December 2024, a new group named the Syrian Popular Resistance announced their opposition to the HTS-led government and threatened to attack HTS forces in response to the civil unrest since the toppling of the Assad regime.[1] BackgroundIn December 2024, a Turkish-backed surprise attack by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other rebel forces overthrew the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, ending over five decades of Assad family rule in Syria. The surprise offensive, originating in the country's northwestern region, supported by American and Israeli air cover on the East of the country, resulted in al-Assad and his family seeking asylum in Russia. HTS Emir and military commander Ahmed al-Sharaa emerged as Syria's de facto leader following the fall of Damascus, with the majority of Syrian Armed Forces troops surrendering, fleeing the country, or defecting.[14] Civil unrestAfter the fall of the Assad regime, escalating tensions were reported in Western Syria, particularly in regions with significant Alawite populations, with riots and civil unrest emerging in multiple locations including Tartus, Latakia, and Bashar's birthplace of Qardaha. Sections of the Alawite population were afraid of potential retribution, due to several Assad loyalist members of the sect being associated with the Ba'athist regime's documented war crimes and increasing demands for justice by people whose relatives were killed or disappeared by pro-Assad forces.[15] On 15 December 2024, The Syrian Observatory of Human Rights reported that pro-Assad insurgents were meeting with village elders in Latakia Governorate, instructing them to resist actions from the newly implemented Military Operations Administration in order to defend "the Alawite sect".[16] On 22 December 2024, civilian demonstrations erupted in the Al-Bahluliyah district east of Latakia, following allegations of misconduct by the Syrian government's security forces, demanding for the complete withdrawal of Syrian security forces from the village. The incident involved armed individuals claiming affiliation with the Syrian government forcibly entered the residence of Al-Bahluliyah's Mukhtar. The intruders reportedly brandished weapons at young residents in the neighborhood and committed various acts of misconduct, including verbal and physical abuse against family members and a girl. Protesters chanted "Death rather than humiliation" in response.[17] On 23 December 2024, hundreds of Christians and their supporters marched through Damascus after foreign fighters set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, a Christian town near Hama. Protestors urged the HTS authorities to protect minorities and for foreign fighters to leave Syria. HTS later said they had detained the arsonists.[18][19][20] Catholic News Agency reported on 31 December 2024 that that some Muslim residents who were displaced from the town of Maaloula by the Assad regime, were threatening and harassing some Christian residents who were accused of collaborating with pro-Assad militant groups.[21] On January 3, 2025, the Alawite Islamic Forum in Syria released a statement on expressing its support for the HTS-led Syrian transitional government but argued that it has failed to deal with the sectarian violence in Western Syria.[22] Attack on Abu Abdullah al-Hussein al-Khusseibi shrine and circulation of its videosOn 25 December, tensions inflamed amongst segments of the Syrian Alawite population in response to online circulation of videos showing footage of an attack on the Alawite shrine of Abu Abdullah al-Hussein al-Khusseibi in Aleppo. Though the incident had occurred weeks earlier, disinformation campaigns spread the footage as recent, aiming to incite discord and violent riots.[23] The attackers killed five shrine custodians, desecrated their remains, vandalized the sacred site, and set fire to the structure.[15][24] The video provoked outrage among sections of Syria's Alawite population.[25] The demonstrations erupted across multiple Alawite neighborhoods in Homs, including Al-Khudari, Wadi Al-Dhahab, Al-Zahraa, Al-Sabil, Al-Abbasiya, and Al-Muhajireen. Protesters expressed outrage over the shrine attack through sectarian chants and public demonstrations, with religious and community leaders denouncing it as an attack on Alawite religious heritage and identity while calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice. Protesters also demanded greater security be granted to the community by the government, and for it to remove all of the extremist and foreign elements from its military. Several protesters were arrested in Homs, Tartus, and Jableh.[26] The Syrian General Security Forces, operating under the new government's Military Operations Department, opened fire to disperse the crowd in Homs, resulting in one protester's death and five others sustaining injuries from gunfire.[24] Verify Syria, a fact-checking organization, reported that a co-ordinated disinformation campaign was launched to circulate misleading posts related to the shrine attack through social media networks of Assad loyalists, with aim of exacerbating sectarian tensions and provide cover for Assad regime officials fleeing Syria.[23] In response to rising tensions, the new government enhanced its security presence in Alawite-dominated regions. Public Security Forces implemented a curfew across Homs, Jableh, and Banias, while military reinforcements established security perimeters around the Akrama and Al-Nahda neighborhoods to stop further unrest. They also established military checkpoints for civilians to hand over their weapons, and set up loudspeakers in mosques instructing them to do so within 24 hours. Many, especially commanders and officers associated with the Assad regime, refused to do so.[15][27] Pro-Assad disinformation campaignSince the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria has experienced a surge in disinformation on social media, targeting both Syrian and international audiences. DW News reported that the flood of online disinformation and inflammatory social media posts has had destabilizing consequences on the ground, such as triggering Alawite riots after the widespread online circulation of misleading posts of a shrine attack that occurred in November.[28][23] Fact-checking organizations, like Verify-Sy and Misbar, have attributed these campaigns to social media accounts associated with Assad loyalists, as well as state propaganda outlets of Russia and Iran. Ba'athist Syria had maintained an extensive state propaganda apparatus, and its collapse created an information vacuum, leaving many Syrians vulnerable to false narratives. Researchers have noted that Russian and Iranian disinformation networks remain active in social media, deploying fake accounts to stoke tensions amongst minorities, particularly the Alawite community, and incite sectarian clashes. Accounts linked to far-right groups in the West have also been amplifying Islamophobic posts targeting Syrian revolutionary activists.[28] ClashesOn 18 December, the Military Operations Administration conducted several raids in Hama and Homs Governorates and in several coastal areas to seek out Assad-associated figures and war criminals.[29] After the fall of the Assad regime, Syrian transitional government also launched large-scale anti-narcotics crackdown campaigns against illicit weapons and drug trafficking networks affiliated with Assad loyalist elements in Western Syria.[30] Tartus Governorate campaignOn 25 December, unidentified armed groups conducted synchronized assaults on multiple security checkpoints in the western Hama countryside with RPG launchers and heavy machine guns, killing one Syrian government troop and injuring another.[31] On the same day, a contingent of the General Security Forces – a police unit loyal to the new government – made their way to the Khirbet al-Ma'zah village in the southern Tartus Governorate. They intended to arrest Major General Mohammad Kanjo Al-Hassan who had headed the Military Justice Administration and Field Court during the rule of the Assad regime; he was regarded as one of those responsible for the mass murders in Saydnaya Prison. Upon entering the village, the General Security Forces were ambushed by militants, with 14 policemen and three attackers being killed. According to SOHR, loyalists of Mohammed Kanjo Hassan and another former Ba'athist officer, Suhayl al-Hasan, were responsible for the ambush.[4] The militants were led by Mohammed Kanjo Hassan's brother and expelled the security forces from the village.[32] The transitional government described the ambush as an attack by Assad loyalists. A curfew was declared at several cities.[25] The government's Military Operations Command subsequently ordered the arrest of the attackers and sent reinforcements to secure Khirbet al-Ma'zah.[4] By 26 December, the Military Operations Command was conducting a large-scale campaign across Tartus Governorate, searching homes and securing the countryside. Major General Mohammad Kanjo Al-Hassan was reportedly captured in Khirbet al-Ma'zah.[32][33] Three gunmen associated with al-Hassan were also killed in the gunfight.[34] On December 26, 2024, the Syrian Transitional Government announced that it had arrested Mohammed Kanjo Hassan, former head of the military judiciary under the Assad regime and a Ba'athist prison officer at the Sednaya prison.[15][35][36] Other villages in the Tartus Governorate saw an "mass escape of former regime members".[32] Two armed individuals from the village of Al-Zarqat, identified as regime loyalists or "shabiha," were killed after engaging in armed conflict with General Security Forces. The security campaign prompted many former regime officials implicated in crimes against Syrian civilians to flee from several villages, including Al-Zuraiqat, Khirbet al-Ma'zah, and surrounding areas.[33] In addition, four Syrian government troops were killed during a raid on a pro-Assad holdout containing trafficking ringleader Shujaa al-Ali in Balqsa, western Homs Governorate.[37] On 16 January 2025, General Security Administration (GSA) busted an effort by pro-Iranian trafficking networks to smuggle weapons from Tartus region to Lebanon.[38] Latakia Governorate CampaignOn 14 December, pro-Assad gunmen ambushed Sham Legion fighters in al-Muzayri'a in the Latakia countryside, killing or wounding fifteen troops.[5] On 14 January, soldiers of the Military Operations Command were kidnapped and taken as hostages by the Assadist commander Bassam Nasir al-Din in Latakia Governorate. Bassam demanded Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces in a video to withdraw from the area within 24 hours or else the soldiers taken hostage would be "slaughtered". Later that day, HTS located Bassam's location using a drone and sent reinforcements to the area to rescue the units taken hostage, and surrounded him in his hideout, ultimately leading to him ending his life by suicide bombing himself. Seven Assadist militants were killed in clashes following the incident, and all kidnapped units were rescued safely and unharmed without any casualties.[39] On 19 January, Syrian security forces captured and destroyed a massive Captagon shipment belonging to drug trafficking networks linked to Maher al-Assad. The Syrian Ministry of Interior announced that roughly 100 million Captagon pills were seized in warehouses near the port of Latakia.[40] On 22 January, pro-Assad gunmen targeted a checkpoint of the Military Operations Command with machine guns and grenades in the industrial area at the entrance of Jableh in the Latakia countryside. The attack left two members of the Military Operations Command dead and two other members injured.[41] On 24 January, a group of pro-Assad militants attacked a security checkpoint in al-Muzayri'a in the Latakia countryside. The General Security Forces repelled the attack and confiscated a vehicle and several firearms from the gunmen who attacked the security checkpoint.[42][43] On 1 February, members of the Military Operations Command were ambushed by the Syrian Popular Resistance on the Latakia-Aleppo highway near Al-Mukhtariyah in Latakia countryside. As a result, one member was killed, two others were injured and a fourth one went missing.[44][45] Hama Governorate CampaignOn 14 December, a raid on Al-Mazra’a in Hama Governorate, regarded as a significant Hezbollah stronghold, was launched by the Syrian Military Operations Administration, resulting in the arrests of "dozens of young men accused of committing previous violations against the people of the area".[46] In an act of sectarian violence, on 1 February, Sunni gunmen killed 10 Alawites including a child and an elderly woman in the village of Arzah.[47] Civilian casualtiesOn 14 December, UK-based Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (SOHR) NGO reported that the brother of the imam of the Great Prophet Mosque in Masyaf, Hama, was executed with three bullets by masked assailants who pursued and abducted him, after the imam was accused of being associated with Iranian and Shia militias and conducting funerals for regional civilians.[48] Two civilians were kidnapped in Al-Zahraa, Homs. Their bodies were discovered in a cooling unit three days later.[49] On 15 December, SOHR reported that three civilians were killed in separate instances by unknown gunmen, one of whom was accused of being an Assad loyalist and tortured before being executed in Halfaya, Hama.[50] On 16 December, SOHR reported that a former Syrian Arab Army soldier and his brother were kidnapped by unknown assailants in a military vehicle as they were in line at a settlement center meant for resolving their security status in the new state. The two were killed, with their bodies disposed of in a forest Wa'er.[51] Masked assailants kidnapped a civilian at gunpoint in Al-Shajar, and executed him near an al-Ghab agricultural research center northwest of Hama. On 17 December, SOHR reported that one civilian was killed by gunmen in Al-Qusayr. Two more civilians were killed by unknown gunmen in Al-Suwaydah, Masyaf.[49] An armed group attacked civilians in Al-Shajar, and kidnapped a farmer who was later found dead with signs of having been tortured beforehand.[52] On 18 December, SOHR reported that a man in al-Tuwaim in the western Hama countryside was killed by two unidentified gunmen after he had tried to stop them from stealing his sheep.[53] On 21 December, SOHR reported that a young man was abducted from his home in Tartus by an unknown armed group after they promised to help him with resolving his security status in the new state, who executed him and mutilated his corpse.[54] On 22 December, SOHR reported that a young man was kidnapped near Homs, taken to Baniyas, and executed in a field by unknown gunmen.[55] On 23 December, SOHR reported that a man and woman were killed in Wadi Al-Nasara by unknown perpetrators.[56] A Yahmour, Homs resident was killed by unknown gunmen after being accused of loyalty to the Assad regime.[57] An unidentified man was found killed by a "field execution" near the Ras Al-Shamra roundabout in Latakia. After one group of unknown gunmen raided and left Hadidah, a second group entered and killed two civilians for unknown reasons.[58] On 24 December, SOHR alleged that three Alawite judges were executed by unknown gunmen while travelling in the western Hama countryside.[59] According to SOHR, Several gunmen attacked and looted the residents of seven houses in the Alawite-majority village of Jidrin.[60] On 25 December, SOHR reported that a medical student was shot dead by an unknown gunman in Latakia.[61] One civilian was found dead on the M4 Motorway in Ariha, Idlib, having been killed by a "field execution". Three more were killed by unknown gunmen in Tal Sarin, Hama.[62] An information engineering university student was executed in the countryside of Jableh by unknown gunmen.[59] On 26 December, SOHR reported that an armed group raided the western Hama Governorate village of al-Aziziyah located in the Ghab Plain, and executed a civilian before arresting eight others and taking them to an unknown location.[63] On 5 January 2025, it was reported that six bodies of workers belonging to the Sayyida Zeinab Shrine were found. The pro-Assad Syrian Popular Resistance accused the HTS-led government of killing the workers.[6] On 8 January 2025, SOHR reported that three civilians of one family were killed in a field execution by unidentified gunmen in Latakia. Another civilian was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in his agricultural land in Hama. Four more people, including three brothers from Tasnin Village near Talbiseh were shot dead by gunmen, while working on the field. It was also reported that the bodies of six civilians were found, two of which were from Khirbet al-Hamam and four from al-Ghazila, where they were reported missing a few days ago in mysterious circumstances while heading to their work and visiting their relatives in Homs countryside.[64] On 10 January 2025, UK-based SOHR reported that a young man from Qardaha in Latakia countryside was killed by unknown gunmen in Hama, where his body was moved to Hama National Hospital. Additionally, a young man, who a student at the College of Engineering, was killed with several gunshots to the head by unknown gunmen, after which his body was thrown into an irrigation canal and later moved to the hospital in Al-Zahra’a neighborhood in Homs.[65] On 13 January 2025, SOHR alleged that two gunmen claiming to belong to the Military Operations Command kidnapped a young man in al-Samiya Village in Latakia countryside, whose body was later found with gunshot wounds, showing signs of a field execution. Meanwhile, the body of another young man, who had been kidnapped from al-Mazra’a Village in the Homs countryside four days earlier, was discovered with gunshot wounds.[66] On 14 January 2025, SOHR asserted that Alawite civilians of Tasnin Village in Homs countryside were assaulted by gunmen who presented themselves as members of the Military Operations Command. According to SOHR, an arrest campaign was launched in the village, which lasted from the early hours of morning to the afternoon of January 16, during which suspects showed resistance. Moreover, the attackers set fire to seven houses and killed six civilians from the village. Residents and elders of Tasnin Village and other neighbouring villages attempted to communicate with security and political officials and police command in Homs, but received no responses regarding the violations.[67] On 16 January 2025, SOHR reported that a young man was killed in indiscriminate gunfire in Jableh in Latakia countryside, while he was celebrating his release from the grip of a group of gunmen.[68] Additionally, two civilians from Al-Majdal village in Mahradah area in the north-western countryside of Hama were kidnapped and shot dead by unidentified gunmen.[69] On 23 January 2025, SOHR reported that a large-scale security campaign was launched by the Military Operations Command with the participation of local gunmen in the villages of al-Ghozaylah, al-Gharbiyah and al-Hamam in the western countryside of Homs, during which four civilians were extrajudicially executed, ten civilians were injured, and five others were arrested. Several additional assaults and abuses against civilians, such as forcing them to bray and bark, as well as the destruction of tombstones were also documented.[70] References
Information related to Western Syria clashes (December 2024–present) |
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