After less than a semester at Harvard Law School, Negroponte joined the Foreign Service in 1960.[4] He served at eight different Foreign Service posts in Asia (including the U.S. Embassy, Saigon),[5] Europe and Latin America, and he also held important positions at the State Department and the White House. As a young Foreign Service officer—one of the few men in Washington who dared to openly disagree with Henry Kissinger's secret handling of the Vietnam peace talks—Negroponte attempted to convince his superior that any peace agreement negotiated without the consent of South Vietnam's leader Nguyen Van Thieu would be doomed to failure. Seymour Hersh claims in his book The Price of Power that Kissinger never forgave Negroponte, and, upon becoming Secretary of State, exiled him to Quito, Ecuador. Ironically, this was to be the beginning of Negroponte's long distinguished career as an ambassador. In 1981, he became the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras. From 1985 to 1987, Negroponte held the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Subsequently, he served as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, from 1987 to 1989; Ambassador to Mexico, from 1989 to 1993; and Ambassador to the Philippines from 1993 to 1996. As Deputy National Security Advisor to President Ronald Reagan, he was involved in the campaign to remove from power General Manuel Noriega in Panama. From 1997 until his appointment as ambassador to the U.N., Negroponte was an executive with McGraw-Hill.[6]
Career
Ambassador to Honduras (1981–1985)
John Negroponte at the Military Camp in Honduras in April 1984
From 1981 to 1985, Negroponte was the U.S. ambassador to Honduras. During this time, military aid to Honduras grew from $4 million to $77.4 million a year, and the US began to maintain a significant military presence there, with the goal of overthrowing the revolutionary Sandinista government of Nicaragua, which had overthrown the Somoza dictatorship in a civil war. [citation needed]
The previous U.S. ambassador to Honduras, Jack Binns, who was appointed by President Jimmy Carter, made numerous complaints about human rights abuses by the Honduran Army under the government of Policarpo Paz García. After the inauguration of Ronald Reagan, Binns was replaced by Negroponte, who has denied any knowledge of wrongdoing by the Honduran Army.
In 1995, The Baltimore Sun published an extensive investigation of U.S. activities in Honduras. Speaking of Negroponte and other senior U.S. officials, an ex-Honduran congressman, Efraín Díaz, was quoted as saying:[7]
Their attitude was one of tolerance and silence. They needed Honduras to loan its territory more than they were concerned about innocent people being killed.[8]
Substantial evidence subsequently emerged to support the contention that Negroponte knew serious violations of human rights were being committed by the Honduran government, but despite this he did not recommend ending U.S. military aid to Honduras. SenatorChristopher Dodd of Connecticut, on September 14, 2001, as reported in the Congressional Record, aired his suspicions on the occasion of Negroponte's nomination to the position of UN ambassador:
Based upon the Committee's review of State Department and CIA documents, it would seem that Ambassador Negroponte knew far more about human rights abuses perpetrated by the Honduran government than he chose to share with the committee in 1989 or in embassy contributions at the time to annual State Department Human Rights reports.[9]
Among other evidence, Dodd cited a 1985 cable sent by Negroponte that made it clear that Negroponte was aware of the threat of "future human rights abuses" by "secret operating cells" left over by General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, the chief of the Honduran armed forces, after he was forcibly removed from his post by fellow military commanders in 1984. The cables reveal that Negroponte repeatedly urged reform of the Honduran criminal code and justice system to replace arbitrary measures taken by the Honduran government after events such as the destruction of the nation's main power plant at Tegucigalpa and the abduction of the entire business establishment of San Pedro Sula, Honduras' second largest city, in 1982.[10] Negroponte's predecessor as Ambassador, Carter appointee Jack Binns acknowledged that human rights abuses committed by the Honduran Army were supported by military assistance from the Argentine junta and the CIA during the Carter administration, and that neither the Honduran government nor the CIA kept the embassy informed of what it was doing.[11] The scale of the carnage in Honduras was limited to less than 300 'disappearances' during the five years of the Negroponte and Binns ambassadorships as compared with 70,000 lost lives as a result of civil war and repression in El Salvador, notwithstanding that Honduras was involved in a low-level civil war punctuated at times by invasions of its territory.[citation needed]
In April 2005, as the Senate confirmation hearings for the National Intelligence post were held, hundreds of documents were released by the State Department in response to a FOIA request by The Washington Post.[citation needed] The documents, cables that Negroponte sent to Washington while serving as ambassador to Honduras, indicated that he played a more active role than previously known in managing US efforts against the leftist Sandinista government next door in Nicaragua. According to the Post, the image of Negroponte that emerges from the cables is that of an:
exceptionally energetic, action-oriented ambassador whose anti-communist convictions led him to downplay human rights abuses in Honduras, the most reliable U.S. ally in the region. There is little in the documents the State Department has released so far to support his assertion that he used "quiet diplomacy" to persuade the Honduran authorities to investigate the most egregious violations, including the mysterious disappearance of dozens of government opponents.[12]
a tough cold warrior who enthusiastically carried out President Ronald Reagan's strategy. They show he sent admiring reports to Washington about the Honduran Army chief, who was blamed for human rights violations, warned that peace talks with the Nicaraguan government might be a dangerous "Trojan horse" and pleaded with officials in Washington to impose greater secrecy on the Honduran role in aiding the contras.
The cables show that Mr. Negroponte worked closely with William J. Casey, then director of central intelligence, on the Reagan administration's anti-Communist offensive in Central America. He helped word a secret 1983 presidential "finding" authorizing support for the Contras, as the Nicaraguan rebels were known, and met regularly with Honduran military officials to win and retain their backing for the covert action.[13]
Both papers based their stories on cables obtained by a Post FOIA request. George Washington University's National Security Archive writes of:
dozens of cables in which the Ambassador sought to undermine regional peace efforts such as the Contadora initiative that ultimately won Costa Rican president Oscar Arias a Nobel Prize, as well as multiple reports of meetings and conversations with Honduran military officers who were instrumental in providing logistical support and infrastructure for CIA covert operations in support of the contras against Nicaragua—"our special project" as Negroponte refers to the contra war in the cable traffic.[14]
Negroponte was opposed to early drafts of peace settlements on the ground that they would have left undisturbed what he described as an enormous threat presented by expansion of the Nicaraguan armed forces with Soviet and Cuban aid. In his tenure in Honduras, Negroponte steered a middle course between State Department and journalistic critics who favored a policy of nonresistance to the militarization of the Sandinista regime to power Nicaragua and its aid to rebel movements in Honduras and El Salvador and 'hard line' persons within the Reagan administration who would have involved the United States in Central America through actions such as blockades, bombing of Nicaraguan airfields, the provision of offensive weapons, and the installation of permanent military bases. A study of American policy has noted that "the United States had a great deal to do with the preservation of Honduran stability. Had it not been for U.S. enticements and pressures elections probably would not have been held in 1980 and 1981. The perpetuation of the military dictatorship would have undermined the legitimacy of the political order, making it far more vulnerable to revolutionary turmoil. By the same token, strong North American opposition to President Suazo's attempt to remain in power in 1985 helped preserve the fragile legitimacy that had been built over the preceding five years... massive economic aid prevented the economy's collapse... without the United States, it might well have disintegrated into chaos."[15] Following Bush-Gorbachev meetings beginning in 1986, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union ended military support for 'proxy wars', in Central America, and free elections in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador followed. Senator Bill Bradley regarded the whole episode as "a minor issue--the supply of arms to the Nicaraguan contras, a policy that took on monumental proportions inside the Beltway and upon those liberals who saw another quagmire in every exercise of military power."[16]
Assistant Secretary for Environment, Oceans and Fisheries (1985–1989)
In this posting, Negroponte together with Ambassador Richard Benedick negotiated the Montreal Protocol on Ozone, the most successful modern environmental treaty, overcoming opposition from Europe, Russia, and China and from some Reagan administration officials. (R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998), 101) He also fostered scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union clashing with 'hard liners' like Richard Perle as well as two treaties relating to cooperation in dealing with nuclear accidents in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster.[citation needed]
Ambassador to Mexico (1989–1993)
During Negroponte's tour as US Ambassador to Mexico, he was instrumental in persuading the Bush administration to respond to a Mexican initiative by negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) despite initial opposition by the U.S. Office of Trade Representative. His tenure in Mexico was thus the most consequential of any modern American ambassadorship. It was observed twenty years later that "Every so often, there comes to light a document revealing the foresight of a public servant who grasped the full consequences and implications of a particular government measure or policy. Such a document was written in the spring of 1991 by the then U.S.Ambassador to Mexico, John Negroponte."[17] Another commentator noted the subsequent proliferation of Negroponte's vision in other free trade agreements.[18] He officiated at the block-long, fortified embassy where he liberalized visa practices.
Ambassador to the UN (2001–2004)
President George W. Bush appointed Negroponte to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in February 2001, and after substantial opposition from Senate Democrats the nomination was ratified by the Senate on September 15, 2001, four days after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. According to CBS News:
At the United Nations, Negroponte, 64, was instrumental in winning unanimous approval of a Security Council resolution that demanded Saddam Hussein comply with U.N. mandates to disarm.[19]
During Colin Powell's speech to the Security Council on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Negroponte could be seen sitting behind Powell's left shoulder. Negroponte, however, had warned the Bush administration about the adverse consequences of intervening in Iraq.[20]
In the New York Review of Books, Stephen Kinzer reported that the messages sent by nominating Negroponte were that "the Bush administration will not be bound by diplomatic niceties as it conducts its foreign policy." A State Department official told him that "Giving him this job is a way of telling the UN: 'We hate you.'"[21]
On April 19, 2004, Negroponte was nominated by U.S. PresidentGeorge W. Bush to be the United States Ambassador to Iraq after the June 30 transfer of sovereignty to the new Iraqi government. He was confirmed by the United States Senate on May 6, 2004, by a vote of 95 to 3, and was sworn in on June 23, 2004, replacing L. Paul Bremer as the U.S.'s highest ranking American civilian in Iraq. He advised the Bush administration that security had to precede reconstruction in Iraq, organized a peaceful election, and gave advice, equally unwelcome to Secretary Rumsfeld and Democrats in Congress, that a five-year commitment would be required.[22]
Director of National Intelligence (2005–2007)
Negroponte's swearing in ceremony as DNI.
On February 17, 2005, President George W. Bush named Negroponte as the first Director of National Intelligence, (DNI), a cabinet-level position charged with coordinating the nation's Intelligence Community.[23] On April 21, 2005, Negroponte was confirmed by a vote of 98 to 2 in the Senate, and subsequently sworn into the office that was called "substantially stronger" than its predecessor position, the Director of Central Intelligence.[24] Part of its power stemmed from the ability to "determine" budgets, prompting President Bush to remark, "That's why John Negroponte is going to have a lot of influence. He will set the budgets."[25] The budget of the Intelligence Community is estimated at $40 billion.[25]
A memorandum in the Federal Register signed May 5, 2006. by President Bush states that Negroponte, as intelligence czar, be delegated the authority to exempt companies from accurate accounting standards, a power previously reserved for the chief executive under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.[26]
Reaction in the intelligence community to Negroponte's nomination was, according to Newsweek, "overwhelmingly positive" because he had "earned the respect of many intel professionals since those early days of the Reagan counterinsurgency."[27]The Times noted, "if anyone can bring a semblance of unity to America's bewildering network of competing spy agencies, it is John Negroponte."[28]
Congressional reaction was also positive. Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), then-vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee said, "I think that Ambassador Negroponte is a very sound choice. Ambassador Negroponte has served bravely and with distinction in Iraq and at the United Nations during a time of turmoil and uncertainty. He brings a record of proven leadership and strong management." Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA), then-ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee noted, "John Negroponte is a smart choice for a very important job. He's a seasoned and skilled diplomat, who has served with distinction at the United Nations and in Iraq -- and he has the full confidence of the president."[29]
According to John MacGaffin, the CIA's former associate deputy director for clandestine operations, "This is a guy who plays hardball. He's a man who understands the whole range of counterintelligence, intelligence and covert action. They're all parts of foreign policy and protecting ourselves."[27] "We've known for the last 40 years that what's wrong [with intelligence] is that no one's in charge," one retired CIA official told Newsweek. "For once we have a chance to do something with someone truly in charge. Negroponte's going to decide what the answer is."[27]
As DNI, Negroponte, "embarked on an impressive array of reform efforts," with "perhaps the most transformational work... [involving] the effort to retool the creaky electronic infrastructure of the intelligence community."[23]
According to U.S. News & World Report, one of Negroponte's first tests was on an overbudget satellite system. The $25 billion system, called the "Future Imagery Architecture," was created as the "foundation for the next generation of America's space-based surveillance efforts." The reality was quite different, as it became, "a managerial nightmare – five years behind schedule and billions over budget. Poor quality control and technical problems raised questions about whether the system would ever work properly." Negroponte "moved decisively" and jettisoned half the classified project.[23]
Negroponte also appointed "mission managers" – intelligence professionals focused on America's hardest targets and most looming threats. The mission managers are focused on counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counterintelligence, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba and Venezuela.[30] According to John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), the mission manager concept, "holds much promise for integrating analysis, collection and other intelligence activities."[31][32]
It has also proven beneficial during potential crises. According to a senior intelligence official quoted in U.S. News & World Report, "In the days after North Korea's recent nuclear test, the DNI put mission manager and CIA veteran Joseph DeTrani at the center of the developing crisis. Along with issuing a twice-daily intelligence summary, DeTrani served as a 'traffic cop,' coordinating analysis, briefing the White House, and tasking spies on what to target."[23]
In a November 2006 cover story in U.S. News & World Report, it was noted that Negroponte and his office, "have made a promising start – and, remarkably, encountered an apparent willingness to embark on the necessary reforms."[23] Progress made included the White House approval of more than 30 DNI recommendations on improving the flow of intelligence and terrorism data to state and local authorities; requiring intelligence agencies to accept each other's clearance; "open[ing] up the analytic process to new ideas and new people" to prevent groupthink – and the creation of an analytic ombudsman; the establishment of an Open Source center, "designed to broaden the flow of ideas to analysts"; and more "red teams" to challenge conventional thinking.[23]
Furthermore, the President's Daily Brief, the highly classified report given to the President each morning by Negroponte, once prepared solely by the Central Intelligence Agency, is now compiled from intelligence agencies across the government. "I believe what I can bring to the community is a sense of what our most important customer is interested in," Negroponte told US News about briefing the president.[23]
In spite of his progress leading the Intelligence Community, though, there were rumors that Negroponte wanted to move back to the field in which he spent 37 years – the State Department and Foreign Service.[33] The rumors became official on January 5, 2007, when Negroponte announced his resignation as DNI and move to the State Department to serve as Deputy Secretary of State.[34]
Former DDCI John McLaughlin wrote after the resignation was announced, "Negroponte must be credited with bringing a reassuring and confident demeanor to a community that had been rocked by controversy."[31]
According to Newsweek, "Under Negroponte, the intel czar's office was praised by both congressional and executive-branch officials for greatly improving—via its National Counterterrorism Center—the sharing among relevant agencies of intelligence reports about terror threats."[31][35]
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State (2007–2009)
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Negroponte was sworn in as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State by President George W. Bush on February 27, 2007.[36] He served in that position until the end of the Bush administration on January 20, 2009.
Ambassador Negroponte joined McLarty Associates, an international strategic advisory firm headquartered in Washington, D.C., in 2009.[37] He serves on the Leadership Council of Concordia,[38] a nonpartisan, nonprofit based in New York City focused on promoting effective public–private collaboration to create a more prosperous and sustainable future.[39]
Negroponte was one of 50 signatories of a statement concerning 2016 Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump in which Trump was called "reckless" and stated that he would "put at risk our country's national security and well-being."[40]
In 2020, Negroponte, along with over 130 other former Republican national security officials, signed a statement that asserted that President Trump was unfit to serve another term, and "To that end, we are firmly convinced that it is in the best interest of our nation that Vice President Joe Biden be elected as the next President of the United States, and we will vote for him."[41]
The Ambassador (2005), Norwegian documentary film that examines the career of John Negroponte, focusing primarily on his time as U.S. Ambassador to Honduras in the early 1980s
Battalion 316, Honduran army unit responsible for carrying out political assassinations and torture of suspected political opponents of the government during the 1980s
^Marshall, Joshua Micah (May 7, 2006). "Big world, small world". Talking Points Memo blog. Archived from the original on August 19, 2006. Retrieved July 21, 2006.
^Menzel, Sewall (2006). Dictators, Drugs & Revolution: Cold War Campaigning in Latin America 1965 - 89. New York: AuthorHouse. pp. 141–43. ISBN9781425935535.
^Binns, Jack (2000). The United States in Honduras, 1980–81: An Ambassador's Memoir. Jefferson: McFarland & Company. pp. 13, 14, 33, 51, 320–22. ISBN9780786407347.
^"2006 Summit Highlights Photo". John D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, receives the Academy's Golden Plate Award presented by Council member President Vaira Vike-Freiberga of Latvia during the 2006 Achievement Summit in Los Angeles.
^"2007 Summit Highlights Photo". The Director of the CIA, General Michael Hayden, is presented with the Golden Plate Award by John Negroponte.
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